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ABSTRACT We show that precise knowledge of epidemic transmission parameters is not required to
build an informative model of the spread of disease. We propose a detailed model of the topology of the
contact network under various external control regimes and demonstrate that this is sufficient to capture the
salient dynamical characteristics and to inform decisions. Contact between individuals in the community is
characterised by a contact graph, the structure of that contact graph is selected to mimic community control
measures. Our model of city-level transmission of an infectious agent (SEIR model) characterises spread via
a (a) scale-free contact network (no control); (b) a random graph (elimination of mass gatherings); and (c)
small world lattice (partial to full lockdown — “social” distancing). This model exhibits good qualitative
agreement between simulation and data from the 2020 pandemic spread of coronavirus. Estimates of the
relevant rate parameters of the SEIR model are obtained and we demonstrate the robustness of our model
predictions under uncertainty of those estimates. The social context and utility of this work is identified,
contributing to a highly effective pandemic response in Western Australia.
INDEX TERMS agent based model, complex network, infectious diseases, propagation on networks
I. INTRODUCTION
MODELLING of disease transmission via compartmen-tal models is well established and generally highly
effective. However, the differential equations of these models
depend on good estimates of underlying rate parameters and
will then provide a continuous solution under the assumption
that the population is well-mixed and homogeneous (i.e. all
individuals have equal contact with all others). Under these
assumptions disease propagation is driven by the parameter
R0 — the ratio of the rate of new infections to the rate of
removal of infectious individuals from the transmission pool.
Typically, and particularly for contemporary and evolving
transmission, these parameters can be somewhat difficult to
estimate [1], [2].
We propose an alternative approach to modelling the
dynamic transmission of diseases. A consequence of this
alternative approach is that the main determinant of epi-
demic dynamic behaviour is the contact network between
individuals rather than precisely chosen optimal values of
epidemic rate parameters. The physics literature is rife with
models of propagation dynamics on networks. We observe
that different societal control measures manifest as distinct
topological structures and model city-level transmission of
an infectious agent. Our approach models changing control
strategies by changing the features of the underlying contact
network with time. This approach allows us to model the
likely time course of a disease and, perhaps surprisingly, we
find that this approaches is both quantifiable and robust to
uncertainty of the underlying rate parameters.
This report is intended as a guide to computational mod-
elling of reported epidemic infection rates when good es-
timates of underlying epidemiological rate parameters are
not available. The model provides a useful prediction of
current control strategies. Nonetheless, we emphasise that the
methodology and techniques are not (of themselves) novel,
they have been discussed extensively in the references cited
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herein. The primary novel contribution of this paper is the
interpretation of complex network topologies as the principal
relevant parameter to characterise control, and a commentary
on the live application of this approach in pandemic response
and recovery. While global efforts to model the spread and
control of coronavirus continue, we are taking a decidedly
local approach. We focus our modelling and discussion on
transmission in Australian cities, which we characterise as
large heterogeneous populations. In particular, we focus on
the most isolated of all cities in Australia, Perth, the capital
of Western Australia. For the purposes of this manuscript we
treat Perth as a single isolated urban centre of approximately
2 million people. Epidemic parameters, which we describe
later, either follow established epidemiological values or are
estimated to fit the time course of infection data. While our
model is specific to one city, we intend that the methods and
conclusion are generic and will be useful elsewhere.
Our model is a model of contact graphs. Different contact
graphs are utilised to model different contact patterns within
the population and hence model the effect of different control
measures. In Sec. II we introduce and discuss a small amount
of the most relevant literature, and in Sec. III we proceed to
describe our model.
II. BACKGROUND
It is no exaggeration to say that pandemic spread of infectious
agents has very recently attracted wide interest. Mathemati-
cal epidemiology is a venerable and well respected field [3].
Propagation of disease in a community is modelled, under the
assumption of a well-mixed and homogeneous population via
differential equations characterising movement of individuals
between disease classes: susceptible (S), exposed (E), infec-
tious (I) or removed (R).
The standard compartmental (i.e. SIR) model dates back to
the mathematical tour de force of Kermack and McKendrick
[4]. The model assumes individuals can be categorised into
one of several compartments: S or I; S, I or R; or, S, E, I,
or R being the most common. Transition between the various
compartments is governed by rate parameters and it is the job
of the mathematical epidemiologist to estimate those rates
— and hence, when dIdt < 0 and the transmission is under
control. In the standard SIR formulation the condition dIdt < 0
can be expressed as aI(t)r ≡ R0 < 1. Efforts to estimate
the relevant parameters for the coronavirus pandemic are
currently underway and are best summarised (from our local
perspective) by the technical reports of Shearer [5], Moss [6]
and co-workers.
Conversely, the renaissance of interest in mathematical
graphs under the guise of complex networks [7], [8], has
raised considerable interest in propagation of infectious
agent-like dynamics on such structures [9], [10]. Commonly,
the agent is either modelling the spread of information or
infection. When one is restricted to the spread of infectious
agents on a network (in the context of epidemiology, a
contact graph) several interesting features arise. In particular,
if that contact graph is a scale free network (i.e. it has a
power-law degree distribution), then the criterion on the key
epidemic threshold to ensure control of the outbreak (for the
SIS model) becomes R0 = 0. [11] Disease transmission be-
comes faster than exponential. In effect, what happens is that
the power-law distribution of the scale-free network ensures
that there is finite probability of the epidemic reaching an
individual with an arbitrary large number of contacts. The
number of secondary infections arising from that individual
will be unbounded and transmission is guaranteed to persist.
Of course, in the real-world nothing is unbounded and Fu and
co-workers [12] showed that a piece-wise linear/constant in-
fectivity was enough to ensure a positive epidemic threshold.
Surprisingly, however, little of the work in the physics lit-
erature on epidemic transmission has examined transmission
on real-world networks. The first evidence (to the best of our
knowledge) that epidemic transmission did really occur on a
scale-free contact graph was provided by Small and others
[13] for the transmission of avian influenza in migratory bird
populations. Curiously, though, the data presented there gave
an exponent for the scale-free distribution of approximately
1.2, significantly lower than the often cited “usual” range
of (2, 3) — that is, the distribution not only had divergent
variance, but also divergent mean.
The emergence of an earlier coronavirus, associated with
the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003,
provided an opportunity to apply the structures and con-
cepts of complex systems to the modelling of infectious
diseases. Small and Tse [14] introduced a complex network
based model of propagation and showed good agreement
between simulations of that model and available case data.
They found that epidemic parameters widely quoted in the
literature were only consistent with observed case data when
including significant nosocomial transmission. [15] Finally,
and most importantly for the current discussion, the scale-
free topology of the model [14] explained super-spreader
events through contact rather than requiring pathologically
highly infectious individuals. [16]
Both the network-based models used to model SARS in
2003 [14]–[16], and the model we describe here are net-
work models of contact between individuals. Unlike what
we will propose in this current communication, the model of
SARS in 2003 was topologically stationary [14]–[16]. The
model assumed a lattice with long-range (i.e. small-world)
connections following a power-law degree distribution. In
those papers [14]–[16] time varying control strategies were
reflected only in changes of the rate parameters. The current
coronovirus outbreak (that is, COVID-19) poses a different
and unique challenge. Since February 2020 (and up to the
time of writing) global transport networks and daily move-
ment of individuals have been disrupted on a global scale.
Entire cities and countries have engaged in various levels
of “lockdown”. We argue that it is neither appropriate nor
sufficient to model this simply by modifying the rate of trans-
mission or rate of removal. In the current work we propose
a network switching model through which the topology of
the network changes to reflect various changes in government
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and community mitigation and control strategies.
In Sec. III we introduce our model structure. Section V
presents our results for the case study of most interest to
us, and Sec. VI describes a process for optimising model
parameters based on observed caseload data.
III. THE MODEL
We assume nodes in our network can be in one of four states,
corresponding to the four states of the standard SEIR model:
susceptible S, exposed E, infected I , and removed R. Rates
govern the probability of transition between these states, with
transition from S to E occurring only through neighbour-to-
neighbour contact on the graph with a node in state I .
For comparison, the standard SEIR compartmental differ-
ential equation based formulation is given by [3]:
dS
dt
dE
dt
dI
dt
dR
dt
 ≡

S′
E′
I ′
R′
 =

−pSI
+pSI − qE
+qE − rI
rI
 , (1)
where p, q, r ∈ (0, 1] determine the rate of infection, latency
and removal respectively. Clearly, if we desire dEdt +
dI
dt < 0
we need pS(t)r < 1. The parameter q determines the average
latency period, and hence the ratio of p and r determines the
rate of spread.
The assumptions underpinning models of the form (1) are
that the population is fully mixed — that is, contacts exist
between all members of the population, or, rather, every in-
dividual is indistinguishable and contacts occur at a constant
rate between individuals. One way to extend this model is to
introduce multi-group or stratified (perhaps by age, vulnera-
bility, comorbidity, or location) transmission models. Doing
so for coronavirus transmission is reasonable and has been
extensively covered elsewhere: for the Australian perspective
see [17], [18] However, this would require estimating distinct
values of p, q and r for each strata. We choose an approach
which has fewer free parameters1 and model infection at the
daily time scale.
Let A be an N -by-N binary symmetric matrix, aij = 1
iff individuals i and j are in contact. The matrix A is the
adjacency matrix of the contact network which we model.
We suppose that all individuals, excluding a small number
who are exposed (E), are initially susceptible (S). Then, at
each time step (each day):
S → E a susceptible node i becomes exposed if there exists a
node j that is infectious (I) and aij = 1 with probability
p;
E → I an exposed node becomes infectious with probability q;
and,
I → R an infectious node becomes removed (R) with probabil-
ity r.
1Our model is a network. One could argue that a network ofN individuals
hasN(N−1)/2 parameters pij governing contact between individual i and
j and (worse) potentially unique ri and qi for each individual. We prefer the
statistical physics approach of describing the key features of a network with
a very small number of parameters.
The model structure is depicted in Fig. 2. Structural pat-
terns of contact within the community are then modelled
by varying the structure of the network A. In this paper we
propose distinct models corresponding to the different con-
trol strategies. in the following four subsections, the control
strategies which we consider are: III-A no control, modelled
with a scale free network; III-B hard isolation, modelled
as a lattice; III-C no mass gatherings via a random graph;
and III-D “social” distancing via a small-world network. We
explore these four distinct network structures in the following
subsections.
A. SCALE-FREE NETWORK B
Let B denote an N -by-N unweighted and undirected scale-
free network. For simplicity (and rapidity of calculation) we
generate this network via the preferential attachment algo-
rithm of Barabasi and Albert [7] — there are good reasons
for not doing this (notably that the rich club will be highly
connected [19]–[21]). Nonetheless, simulations presented
here did not depend on the choice of the Barabasi-Albert
model over alternatives including the configuration model or
likelihood approaches [21]. The network B is parameterised
by k2 the number of new edges associated with each new node
and so we represent it as B(k) (if each new node contributes
k
2 new edges, then the mean degree will be k). Here, to ensure
comparable number of edges, we choose k = 4.
The network B(k) provides a model of random contacts
in a community. There is ample evidence that individual con-
tact patterns follow an approximately scale-free distribution.
Specifically, in the context of the current pandemic, there is
clear evidence in large scale community spread of COVID-19
at sporting events and other mass gatherings which are well
modelled via the tail of a scale-free distribution [22]–[24].
Due to the random wiring of connections between nodes we
expect contact networkB to yield at least exponential growth
of infection. The tail of the degree distribution is unbounded
and so the actual growth rate is greater than exponential.
B. REGULAR LATTICE L(0)
Let L denote a regular two dimensional lattice with periodic
boundary conditions. Each node has four adjacent neigh-
bours. For consistency with what follows we denote this as
L(0). Growth of infection on a lattice will be equivalent to
diffusion in two dimensions and hence the infected popula-
tion will grow geometrically – in the case of the configuration
discussed here growth is sub-linear.
Lattice configuration is used here as an approximation to
hard isolation: individuals do not move in geographical space
and are therefore only connected to neighbours. Intuitively,
one might expect a hard isolation model to consist of small
isolated clusters corresponding to individual family units.
In addition to being uninteresting – for the very obvious
reason that transmission would cease – such a model is overly
optimistic. Transmission would still be expected to occur
between neighbours (in the ordinary sense of the word). The
regular lattice configuration model is able to model such
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infection between family units, and adjacent dwellings. This
is exactly the philosophy behind the model structure of [15].
C. RANDOM GRAPH L(1)
Let L(1) denote an random graph (ala Erdös-Renyi [8])
with mean degree equal to four. Connections between nodes
are chosen uniformly at random and constrained to avoid
multiple edges or self-loops. That is, each edge is randomly
chosen to connect two nodes within the network, subject to
the constraint of no self-loops and no multiple edges. At the
opposite extreme to L(0) we denote by L(1) the lattice graph
with no lattice structure — here all connections have been
rewired and hence correspond to complete random wiring.
Unlike B the degree distribution of L(1) is binomial (there is
a fixed constant probability that a link exists between any two
random nodes, independent of all other structure). Hence,
whileB will be characterised by super-spreader events (spiky
outliers in the daily infection count), spreading with L(1)
contacts is exponential but devoid of extreme events.
The random graph model represents a mixing populace
with limitations placed on mass gatherings.
D. SMALL-WORLD LATTICE L(S)
Finally, let L(s) denote a Watts-Strogatz [25] two-
dimensional lattice with random rewiring with probability s.
That is, the network L(s) is constructed as a regular lattice
L(0) each edge emanating from node-i has a probability s
of being disconnected from the neighbour node-j and then
rewired between node i and random node-k (in doing so, one
node will decrease in degree by one, and one will increase by
one).
For s > 0, the graph L(s) is an imperfect approximation to
L(0). That is, individuals are bound in a lattice configuration
due to being geographically constrained. However, a fraction
of individuals still exhibit long range connections. Effec-
tively, the model L(s) assumes that the populace is practising
what is referred to in the popular press as “social distancing”
(everyone is fixed at a home location and connected only to
others in the same vicinity). However, there is some finite
limit to compliance with the enforced isolation. A probability
s of a given link switching and therefore connecting random
nodes corresponds to a fraction c = (1 − s)k of nodes
compliant with these distancing measures since all there k
edges are not switched.
In opposition to the standard and rather flawed nomen-
clature, we will refer to this control strategy as physical
distancing.
IV. GROWTH RATES
We now provide estimates of the characteristic growth rates
for propagation on the network structures described above.
A widely used approach [26] is to replace the compartmen-
tal equations (1) with distinct equations for nodes of each
degree. What we describe here is the approach commonly
adopted in the physics literature. For an excellent treatment
of the original theoretical biology approach see [27]. Let Sk,
Ek, Ik and Rk denote the number of nodes of degree k in
state S, E, I or R. The system (1) then becomes
S′k
E′k
I ′k
R′k

k
=

−pSk
∑
` kP (`)I`
pSk
∑
` kP (`)I` − qEk
qEk − rIk
rIk

k
, (2)
where P (`) is the degree distribution of the network A. In
general P (`) is a little unsatisfactory as we should really
compute the sum over P (`|k). But even in the SIS case, doing
so becomes rather unwieldy. Conversely, for SEIR-type or
(SIR) epidemics the asymptotic state is trivial: Sk(t)→ S∗k ∈
(0, S(0)), Ik(t), Ek(t) → 0 and Rk(t) → R∗k ∈ (0, S(0)).
This provides no insight.
Nonetheless, we are interested in growth rate which is
determined via decrease in the susceptible population
pkSk
∑
`
P (`)I`.
In the scale free case P (`) ∝ `−γ and hence growth is
super-exponential: high degree nodes have a contact rate
proportional to their degree and a non-zero probability of
connecting to other high degree nodes.
Conversely, suppose that each node has a fixed degree
P (`) =
{
1 ` = L
0 otherwise
.
In our lattice model L = 4. The growth rate is then given
by pSkLIL, system (2) immediately reduces to (1), and one
is left with the usual exponential growth or decay. Hereafter,
we are considering only nodes of degree k = L and will
drop the subscript k for convenience. However, for s < 1
this reasoning is flawed.
Employing (1), assumes perfect mixing and hence random
distribution of infectious and susceptible nodes on the lattice.
Under diffusion the infectious nodes will spread in a single
cluster: nodes in that cluster will be in class E, I or R and the
remainder of the population will be susceptible. The cluster
will be of size E + I + R and the exposed boundary will
be of size scaling with
√
E + I +R, nodes on that exterior
will be either E or I (we assume that diffusion is fast enough
that the removed nodes are interior — this is certainly only
an approximation and will depend on relative values of p, q
and r), but only the nodes in state I are infectious. Hence, the
number of infectious nodes in contact with susceptibles will
scale with a quantity bounded by IE+I+R
√
E + I +R and√
E + I +R — mostly likely around IE+I
√
E + I +R.2
On average, only half the links from an infectious node
will point to a susceptible (the remainder will point to other
nodes in the cluster), hence, the number of susceptible nodes
connected to an infected node is approximated by
I
2(E + I)
√
E + I +R
2Throughout, we’ve assumed a 2-D lattice. Of course, this choice is
arbitrary and an N -D lattice would naturally lead to an expression involve
the exponent N − 1N with the random model prevailing at n→∞.
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t < t∗ t > t∗
N 14502
ITh 150
p 0.2 1
12
q 1
7
1
7
r 1
14
1
4
TABLE 1. Epidemic simulation parameters. The simulation size N is chosen
to be a square number to make the construction of L(s) simpler. Latency
period of q = 17 is comparable to observation, the other parameters are
estimated derived from the values used in [5], [6] for Australian populations.
These parameter values ensure growth in infection for t < t∗ but barely
endemic otherwise (for A 6= B). That is, these parameters are selected to
match the observed data for our principle region of interest. Subsequent
parameter sensitivity computation will indicate that variation of these
parameters does not change the qualitative features, only the scale of the
observed simulations.
and the proportion of susceptible nodes that satisfy this
condition will be
I
√
E + I +R
2S(E + I)
.
Hence, the expected number of new infections from a lattice
diffusion model is obtained from the product of the rate p and
the contact between these exposed infected and susceptible
individuals
p×
(
I
√
E + I +R
2(E + I)
)
×
(
I
2(E + I)
√
E + I +R
)
= p×
(
I2(E + I +R)
4(E + I)2
)
.
We note in passing that typically S  E ∝ I > R
— certainly during initial growth, or in the case of limited
penetration. Moreover, the arguments above only hold when
S  E, I .
Finally, in a small-world model there is probability s of a
link pointing to a random distant location. With S  E +
I + R we assume that that link is pointing to a susceptible
node and so the expected number of new infections is now
(1− s)p
(
I2(E + I +R)
4(E + I)2
)
+ spSI.
Since,E and I are linearly proportionate, the first term scales
(very roughly) like (E+I+R) the second like SI . That is, a
mixture of the sub-linear growth dictated by the lattice (with
proportion 1− s) and the classical compartmental model (1)
with probability s. Considering the E and I individuals as a
single pool, the rate of new infections is balanced by the rate
of removal rI and so infection will grow if
p
r
(
(1− s)
(
I(E + I +R)
4(E + I)2
)
+ sS
)
> 1.
V. RESULTS
In this section we first present results of the application of
this model. We choose a city of population of approximately
2.1×106 (Perth, Western Australia) and perform a simulation
with initial exposed seeds and contact network A = B (for
0 ≤ t < t∗). The transition time t∗ is the time with I(t) >
ITh for some threshold infection load ITh for the first time
(i.e. I(t) < ITh for all t < t∗ and I(t∗) ≥ ITh. For t > t∗
we set B = L(s) for various values of s. In what follows we
will use p(t > t∗) to denote the value of parameter p assumed
for all time t > t∗, similar notation is adopted for p(t < t∗)
and also for parameter r.
The epidemic parameters which we have chosen for this
simulation are illustrated in Table 1. We do not wish to dwell
on the epidemiological appropriateness of these parameters
— except to say that the were chosen to be consistent with
our understanding of epidemiology and also gave results
that appropriately coincided with the available time series
data. The specific parameter values described in Table 1
were computed to be consistent with those employed by
[5], [6]. However, the models described in [5], [6] are more
epidemiologically detailed than ours and hence the parameter
values reported here represent an agglomeration of various
rates. Moreover, we confirm empirically that the rate of
spread implied by these parameter choices shows very good
agreement with the transmission data for Australia — see
Sec. VI-B.
Some brief notes on the effect of parameter selection are
in order. First, varying ITh will delay the transition to a “con-
trolled” regime and produce a larger peak. The parameter q
is largely determined by the epidemiology of the infection,
and for coronavirus COVID-19 is fairly well established [6].
It does have an important influence on the time delay of
the system, but that is not evident from Fig. 1. Second, the
parameters p and r for t < t∗ also determine the initial
rate of spread — as standard epidemiology would expect.
Third, the value of these parameters for t > t∗ determine
the length of the “tail”. In all simulations these parameters
are chosen so that a well mixed population would sustain
endemic infection. It is the network structure, not fudging
of these parameters that causes extinction of the infection —
this will be further illustrated in Fig. 3.
Figure 1 depicts one ensemble of simulations. Of note
from Fig. 1 is the complete infection of the population
without control. Conversely, the random Erdös-Renyi graph
L(1) has a sufficiently narrow degree distribution that the
infection does (slowly) die away. Various values of L(s) with
s ∈ (0, 1) have the expected effect of gradually decreasing
the total extent and duration of the outbreak. However, it
is important to note that the 90% confidence windows are
very wide and overlap almost entirely — while, on average
smaller s is better this is very often not evident from individ-
ual simulations. This is due to random variation in the initial
spread for t < t∗.
It is very clear from Fig. 1 that the variance between
simulations is similar in magnitude to variation in parame-
ters. However, parameters in Fig. 1 correspond to moderate
parameters p and r and a wide variation in social isolation.
In an effort to understand the parameter sensitivity of this
simulation we perform repeated simulations over a wide
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range of p(t > t∗) and r(t > t∗). For all selected values
we generate 20 simulations of 300 days each and compute
several indicators of infection penetration
• Mean total infection: The total number of individuals
that become exposed, infected or removed during the
duration of the simulation. That is, maxt S(0)−S(t) =
S(0)− S(300).
• Mean maximum infected: The maximum daily re-
ported number of infections - that is, the maximum
number of new infected individuals: −maxt(S(t) +
E(t)− S(t− 1)− E(t− 1)
• Half recovered time: The time in days required for half
the simulations to entirely eliminate infection. That is,
the median (over simulations) of the minimum (over
time) t such that E(t) + I(t) = 0
Results for ITh = 100 are reported in Fig. 3, varying
ITh simply scales the reported numbers (data not shown).
Depicted in Figs. 3 and 4 are computed values of the mean
total infection. The other parameters described above behave
in a consistent manner.
Figures 3 and 4 starkly illustrate the importance, for the
2020 coronavirus pandemic, of implementing and stringently
enforcing isolation. Without isolation the epidemic impact
is limited only for very optimistic values of p(t > t∗) and
r(t > t∗). Otherwise, the mean behaviour indicates infection
growth by two orders of magnitude within 300 days - almost
complete penetration. Our simulations indicate that this first
becomes a risk as physical distancing is less than 90% effec-
tive. There is a boundary in our simulations which appears
below 90% isolation and grows to include even moderate
values of the other epidemic control parameters p(t > t∗)
and r(t > t∗).
VI. PARAMETER SELECTION
In part, our aim with this communication is to dissuade the
application of modelling of time series to predict certain
specific futures. That is, we are interested in simulation and
inferring structure from the ensemble of such simulations.
The random variation reported in Fig. 1 should discourage
all but the most foolhardy from prediction. Nonetheless, it is
valid to ask two questions of observed time series data: (1)
what parameter values are most likely given this observed
trajectory, and (2) which trajectory (or set of trajectories)
are most consistent with the current state. The first question
we will address via a greedy optimisation procedure, to be
described below. The second question is equivalent to asking
for an ensemble estimate of the current state of exposed but
undetected individuals within the community. A complete
study of this second problem is beyond the scope of the
present discussion, but some points are worth considering
before we return to the issue of parameter estimation in Sec.
VI-B. Finally, in Sec. VI-C we provide some estimates of
the effectiveness of various control measures during recovery
phase, subsequent to localised eradication.
A. STATE ESTIMATION
As noted previously, there is very significant variation be-
tween trajectories for the same model parameter settings.
While this means that the construction of more complex
models – solely from time series data – is inadvisable, it
is natural to seek to explain this variability. Simulations
conducted above for an SEIR model with nontrivial latency
period indicates that at any instance in time there is a large
number of exposed but undetected individuals within the net-
work. The location of this exposed class within the network
(their distribution relative to hubs, for example) explains
the variation we observe. This has been demonstrated by
simulation from repeated random distributions of exposed
individuals. It is easy to estimate the expected number E(t)
from the time series I(t) and R(t), however, the distribution
of these individuals on the network is not uniform. The
question that must be addressed to resolve this issue is what
is the expected distribution of E(t) random walkers on a
network A? In the interest of clarity and succinctness, we
do not address this issue here. For the purposes of Sec. VI-C,
below, we simply model a re-introduction of infection as a
small number of exposed individuals randomly distributed on
the contact graph.
B. PARAMETER ESTIMATION
A separate problem is to determine the maximum likelihood
values of the parameters p, q, and r for a given population N
and ITh from an observed time series. This can be decom-
posed to several discrete steps.
1) We suppose that q is fixed and estimable by other
means. For COVID-19, for example, q should yield
a latency period of 7-14 days [6], [17]. Hence q ∈
( 114 ,
1
7 ).
2) Determine the epidemic peak from the time series —
this will define the turning point and the time when
growth changes from exponential for geometric. This
will allow one to determine ITh and the corresponding
t∗. In effect we are now seeking a turning point of the
total number of infections (S(0) − S(t)) and not just
I(t) as done in Fig. 1.
3) For t < t∗ determine p(t < t∗) and r(t < t∗). The
ratio of these two parameters determines the epidemic
growth rate via R0
4) For t > t∗ it remains to determine s, p(t > t∗) and
r(t > t∗). We note that s controls the extent to which
the system is driven by diffusion (geometric) versus
exponential growth. But, for now, the best we can do
is a greedy likelihood maximisation process.
Note that, in the event that the peak has not yet been
reached (i.e. t < t∗) it is not even sensible to attempt
to estimate the parameters s, p(t > t∗) and r(t > t∗).
Nonetheless, in this situation one can estimate instantaneous
(or windowed) values for R0 and attempt to pick the end of
the exponential growth phase. The latency introduced by q
somewhat complicates this process. Figure 5 illustrates the
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result of such a calculation. Finally, we note (as is indicated
in the illustrated exemplars) that we assume a single policy
change-point t∗ — this is clearly inappropriate for more
complex time dependent responses.3 Of course the value of
t∗ is actually determined by societal responses and control
measures instituted in response to an outbreak. That is, it
should, in principal be observable. Nonetheless, it is not clear
that this will necessarily translate to the time when control
takes effect — nor will it necessarily be possible to reduce it
to a single control point. Hence, the value of t∗ we introduce
here is a single parameter value corresponding to the single
moment in time when a broad range of control measures
modify the dynamics of the epidemic.
C. CONTROLLED RECOVERY
Finally, in Fig. 6 we explore the effect of control measures
to mitigated against reemergence of the virus. We assume a
healthy population and five individuals in state E. We then
simulate various different control measures, again modelled
via complex networks as contact graphs. The population is
2.1 × 106, as before, and the parameters p = 110 , q = 18 and
r = 14 represent a state of heightened vigilance — but not
sufficient to suppress infection. Each of the control measures
described in the figure is modelled as follows
• Mass gatherings are modelled with A = B(k) a scale-
free network and hence no upper bound on the number
of contacts a node might have.
• Contact tracing (CT) is modelled by assuming that a
fraction w of the population has adopted contact tracing
through their mobile device. Hence, if an infection were
to occur between two such individuals, that infection
will be extinguished via intervention from authorities.
The fraction of links that are effectively removed is w2.
• N person limit is modelled by truncating the scale-free
network so that no node has degree larger than N . This
is equivalent to the treatment described in [12].
• No Mass gatherings are modelled with A = L(1), as
before.
• d% Stay home models physical isolation of a fraction
d
100 of the population and is modelled with a small world
lattice L(s) where d = (1− s)k.
VII. SOCIAL CONTEXT AND UTILITY
This model has its origins in the severe societal challenge
of COVID-19, when the population of Perth was facing the
prospect of loss of 30,000 lives, and hospitals being over-run
within two or three weeks if the rate of escalation continued.
The model was first used in a pandemic response workshop
for a city of 100,000 people, led by the second author. The
model results informed the importance in influencing peo-
ple’s behaviour, to greater than 90% compliance, and hence
the guidance to give to the city officers in the workshop. It
served to demonstrate the dramatic range of outcomes which
were possible, depending on the behaviour of constituents
3Or for regimes with inconsistent, indecisive or ineffectual responses.
of the city, and degree of social distancing achieved. This
proved very effective in enabling appropriate action, both in
the workshop and afterwards with the city response seen as
a model. Subsequently the results were shared on profes-
sional social media, and an online conference, influencing
thousands more.
In combination with effective timely coordinated state
and federal government polices, and a high level of soci-
etal compliance, a very strong result of virus suppression
was achieved. The model was further developed to update
progress, within two weeks, and at the time of the workshop
debrief this was used to show the importance of continuing
measures in suppression, and the rate at which rapid outbreak
could occur, even in the context of strong initial suppression.
This allowed the appropriate focus to shift towards a positive
recovery. Again this was shared locally and internationally to
provide hope for others and influence behaviour.
Subsequently, the actual case data within the state was
plotted against the forecast range, and this was shared with
state scientific authorities, enabling a constructive discussion
about the correlation between application of selected state
and national control measures and outcomes. The extension
to modelling different approaches to recovery continues in
a similar mode, with distinctive results, and the model out-
comes have since been included in briefings for state health
authorities and COVID-19 safety training.
To gain most value from the model, its results have been
interpreted in a variety of environments, including most
recently in collaborative virtual reality mode, in a digital
Public Health Emergency Operations Centre (PHEOC) (Fig.
7). This has the advantage of rich immersion in the data,
while allowing deep multi-party interaction and dialogue to
discern appropriate observations, and at the same time allow
parties to engage together from anywhere in the world. At the
time of drafting, the number of new cases of COVID-19 has
for the first time reached zero, with only seven fatalities in the
State to date, remarkably low compared to world averages.
A few weeks later the disease had been eliminated from the
hospital system in Western Australia.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The model we present here has a small – perhaps minimal –
number of parameters, and describes the observed dynamics
of pandemic disease transmission. When applied to data
from the global outbreak of coronavirus in 2019/2020, the
model provides good qualitative agreement with observed
data across population centres. Nonetheless, identical sim-
ulations with new initial conditions yield vastly different
outcomes. The variance of our model predictions is large,
and in fact much larger than the variance observed between
distinct epidemiological parameter values. Hence, choice of
optimal transmission rates is a secondary concern behind
appropriate description of contact patterns and transmission
mitigation strategy. Our results indicate that particular simu-
lations of models that claim to have predictive power within
that prediction envelope may be prone to over-interpretation.
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Finally, despite modelling a complex system with complex
networks we have demonstrated the sufficiency of a minimal
model. Models with large numbers of parameters which
are fitted to time series data are unnecessary and likely to
be unreliable and misrepresent the underlying dynamical
process. Our model emphasises accurate reproduction of the
qualitative behaviour of the system, this does not preclude the
construction of more complex models when sound epidemio-
logical reasoning dictates it is necessary and when informed
with direct evidence to allow for quantitative estimation of
the relevant parameters.
While we are reluctant to make predictions from, or
over interpret the application of, this model to the current
coronovirus pandemic, our results indicate that strict phys-
ical isolation in combination with monitoring and the usual
transmission mitigation strategies are required to minimise
impact. Below 80% compliance with physical isolation mea-
sures risks catastrophic spread of infection (Fig. 4). This data
is consistent with the evidence of explosive growth of in-
fection experienced in some localities. Without decisive and
potentially severe intervention, similar disasters are likely to
occur in regions with weaker health systems.
In the simulations described above, we do not make any
attempt to ensure “pseudo-continuity” between time varying
manifestations ofA. That is, nodes that are connected for one
network are not more likely to be connected after switching
the network topology. We could see no simple and generic
way in which to achieve this. Moreover, we did not detect any
excessive mixing that one might expect should this mismatch
be an issue.
It is worth noting that the computation cost of this model
— despite being a population level simulation — is not great.
We simulate the state of an entire population, but at each
iteration the updates are determined entirely by a predefined
contact structure. For population size N and simulating T
time steps the computational time cost is NT . The memory
requirement isN+N logN (for a sparse contact network and
population state vector). This modest computation demand
mean that the algorithm can be successfully deployed in
immersive, interactive and real-time environments.
In Sec. VI-A we raise the issue of estimating the expected
distribution of unobserved infection sites (i.e. state E) on a
network. Should the model described here prove relevant,
this will be an issue of immense importance to the proper
quantification of uncertain future behaviour. Figure 6 illus-
trates the application of these technique for future scenario
planning.
Finally, the social context and utility of this modelling
is demonstrated by its live use in shaping the planning and
implementation of a highly effective response to COVID-19
on a city and state level. Ultimately, one must ask what is
the purpose of modelling. Epidemic disease transmission is
a fairly simple mathematical problem — exponential growth
followed by decay. The difficulty is in reliably estimating
parameters. We show that the contact structure provides a
direct and effective approach to model control strategies.
In addition to the information provided by our simulations,
we describe in Sec. VII the application of these methods to
effectively inform and influence policy makers.
DATA AVAILABILITY
Source code for all calculations described in the manuscript
is available on https://github.com/m-small/epinets. Data
was obtained from https://github.com/CSSEGISandData/
COVID-19.
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FIGURE 1. Predicted epidemic time series. The upper panel is daily new infected individuals (i.e. −∆(S(t) + E(t))), lower panel is total number infected
(S(0)− S(t)). For each network configuration, results show mean and distribution of 100 simulations over 240 days. In black A = B(4) for all time. In other
simulations A = B(4) for all t until I(t) > 150, otherwise A = L(s) with values of s from 0 to 1. The shaded envelopes are 90% confidence intervals. To compute
the fraction of population compliant with social isolation measures d we compute d = P (no rewired links) = (1− s)k (here, the number of neighbours k = 4).
Epidemic parameters follow the values established for our later simulations in Table 1. For the purposes of this plot, we vary only s — the rewiring probability from
s = 0 to s = 0.15.
10 VOLUME 4, 2016
Author et al.: Preparation of Papers for IEEE TRANSACTIONS and JOURNALS
FIGURE 2. Model flow chart. A Graphical representation of the model state transition process. Each node can be in one of four states S, E, I, or R with transition
between them determined by probabilities p, q and r and the contact process of elements aij of the network adjacency matrix A. Hence node-i has probability
paij of being infected through contact with node-j.
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FIGURE 3. Parameter sensitivity. The four surfaces explore the expected total number of infections (population N = 14502) for various parameter values p and r
(for t > t∗) and different control strategies (i.e. L(s) for different s). The four surfaces depicted here correspond to (a) s = 0.0025; (b) s = 0.026; (c) s = 0.054;
(d) s = 0.065 (that is, 99%, 90%, 80% and 70% observance of physical distancing measures). The three coordinates are (x) r; (y) p; and (z)
log(maxt(S(0)− S(t))) (the logarithm base-10 of the total number of infections). In each case we computed 80 simulations of 300 days. Other parameters are as
reported in Table 1. Surface (a) and (b) exhibit linear scaling with changing parameter values p(t > t∗) and r(t > t∗), while for (c) and (d) that growth is
exponential. That is, when compliance with isolation measures drops below 90% there is an explosive growth in the level of infection with p(t > t∗) and r(t > t∗).
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FIGURE 4. Parameter sensitivity. The three panels explore the expected total
number of infections (population N = 14502) for various parameter values
p(t > t∗) and r(t > t∗) (i.e p and r for t > t∗) and different control
strategies (i.e. L(s) for different s). The four panels depicted here correspond
to (a) s = 0.013; (b) s = 0.026; (c) s = 0.054 (90%, 80%, 70% physical
distancing as reported in the panel headings). In each case we computed 80
simulations of 300 days. Other parameters are as reported in Table 1). Note
that panel (a) has a linear ordinate, panel (b) and (c) are depicted with a
logarithmic scale. As in Fig. 3 we observe explosive growth in impact with
lower levels of compliance.
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FIGURE 5. Control evaluation. We depict the effectiveness of control measures for each Australian state and internal territory (excluding Jervis Bay). In each case
the epidemic diffusion is fitted to data up to the end of the exponential growth phase (that is, the point of inflexion on curves S(0)− S(t)). Simulations up to this
time point t∗ effectively seed the network and provide a distribution of infectious and exposed individuals within the community. Beyond this point we simulate the
application of small-world control network structure L(s) for various values of s. Here we illustrate s = 0.013, s = 0.026 and s = 0.054 corresponding to 95%,
90% and 80% control. Actual observed time series data is also shown and illustrates exception effectiveness of control measures for various Australian states.
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FIGURE 6. Recovery and return. Here we depict the effect of various palliative control measures in the event of a reemergence of infection (modelled here by a
population seeded with 5 exposed (infected but asymptomatic) individuals. The four solid lines represent a return to mass gatherings (black), a 50 person limit on
gatherings (red), no mass gatherings (blue), and continued physical distancing (green). The dashed lines model the same scenarios with the addition of 50% of the
population adopting and using contact tracing software (CT). Note that the red (second solid) line grows exponentially, the black line (top) is faster than exponential
and the blue and green (bottom) lines are significantly below exponential. In all cases these lines represent the median of 100 simulations.
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FIGURE 7. Immersive multiperson visualisation of the model in context using virtual reality. Here illustrated in our implementation of a digital Public Health
Emergency Operations Centre, where the model is integrated into wider contextual information such as national trends and geospatial information. The model is
used to communicate scenarios allowing stakeholders able to draw conclusions collaboratively in context.
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